4 Dasein and disclosure
Heidegger calls human being ‘Dasein’, the entity whose being consists in disclosing and understanding being, whether the being of itself or that of other entities. In so far as Dasein’s being is a disclosure of its own being, it is called ‘existence’ or ‘ek- sistence’: self-referential standing-out-unto-itself. Dasein’s very being consists in being related, with understanding and concern, to itself.
But Dasein is not just related to itself. Existence occurs only as being-in-the-world; that is, the openness of human being to itself entails the openness of the world for other entities. One of Heidegger’s neologisms for ‘openness’ is ‘the there’ (das Da), which he uses in two interrelated senses. First, human being is its own ‘there’: as a thrown project, existence sustains its own openness to itself. And second, in so doing, human being also makes possible the world’s openness as the ‘there’ for other entities. Human being’s self-disclosure makes possible the disclosure of other entities.
Heidegger calls human being in both these capacities ‘being-the-there’ – Dasein, or sometimes Da-sein when it refers to the second capacity. In ordinary German Dasein means existence in the usual sense: being there in space and time as contrasted with not being at all. However, in Heidegger’s usage Dasein means being disclosive of something (whether that be oneself or another entity) in its being. In a word, Dasein is disclosive. And since human being is radically finite, disclosure is radically finite.
The Greek word for disclosure is alēthēia, a term composed of the privative prefix a- (un- or dis-) and the root lēthē (hiddenness or closure). Heidegger finds the finitude of dis-closure inscribed in the word a-lēthēia. To disclose something is to momentarily rescue it from (a-) some prior unavailability (lēthē), and to hold it for a while in presence.
Heidegger discusses three levels of disclosure, ranging from the original to the derivative, each of which involves Dasein: (1) disclosure-as-such, (2) the disclosedness of entities in their being, and (3) disclosure in propositional statements. Heidegger’s chief interest is in the first. There, disclosure/alēthēia is the original occurrence that issues in meaningful presence (being).
Heidegger argues that levels 1 and 2 are distinct but inseparable and, taken together, make possible level 3. The word ‘truth’ properly applies only at the third level, where it is a property of statements that correctly represent complex states of affairs. Therefore, to the question ‘What is the essence of truth?’ – that is, ‘What makes the truth of propositions possible at level 3?’ – Heidegger answers: Proximally, the disclosure of entities in their being (level 2); and ultimately, disclosure-as-such (level 1). His argument unfolds as follows.
Level 1. Disclosure-as-such is the very opening-up of the field of significance. It is the engendering and sustaining of world on the basis of Dasein’s becoming-absent. In so far as it marks the birth of significance and the genesis of being, disclosure-as-such or world-disclosure is the reason why any specific entity can have meaningful presence at all.
There are three corollaries. First, the disclosure of world never happens except in Dasein’s being; indeed, without Dasein, there is no openness at all. The engendering and sustaining of the dynamic relations that constitute the very possibility of significance occurs only as long as Dasein exists as mortal becoming. And conversely, wherever there is Dasein, there is world. Second, disclosure-as-such never happens apart from the disclosedness of entities as being this or that. In speaking of disclosure ‘as such’, Heidegger is naming the originating source and general structure of all possible significance that might accrue to any entity at all. The result of disclosure-as- such is the fact that referral-to-mortal-Dasein (that is, significance) is the basic state of whatever entities happen to show up. Third, disclosure-as-such is always prior to and makes possible concrete human action in any specific world. Such concrete actions run the risk of not being disclosive (that is, being mistaken about the meaning of something). By contrast, world-disclosure is always disclosive in so far as it is the opening-up of the very possibility of significance at all.
Alēthēia/disclosure-as-such – how it comes about, the structure it has, and what it makes possible – is the central topic or ‘thing itself’ of Heidegger’s thought. He sometimes calls it the ‘clearing’ of being. He also calls it ‘being itself’ or ‘being-as- such’ (that is, the very engendering of being). Frequently, and inadequately, he calls it the ‘truth’ of being.
Level 2. What disclosure-as-such makes possible is the pre-predicative availability of entities in their current mode of being. This pre-predicative availability constitutes level 2, the basic, everyday disclosedness of entities as meaningfully present. This disclosedness is always finite, and that entails two things.
First, what disclosure-as-such makes possible is not simply the being of an entity but rather the being of that entity as or as not something: for instance, this stone as not a missile but as a hammer. I know the stone only in terms of one or another of its possibilities: the entity becomes present not fully and immediately but only partially and discursively. Thus the entity’s being is always finite, always a matter of synthesis-and- differentiation: being-as-and-as-not. Second, disclosure-as-such lets an entity be present not in its eternal essence but only in its current meaning in a given situation; moreover, it shows that this specific entity is not the only one that might have this meaning. For example, in the present situation I understand this stone not as a paperweight or a weapon but as a hammer. I also understand it as not the best instrument for the job: a mallet would do better.
Even though it is a matter of synthesis-and-differentiation, this pre-predicative hermeneutical understanding of being requires no thematic articulation, either mental or verbal, and no theoretical knowledge. It usually evidences itself in the mere doing of something. Nevertheless, in a more developed but still pre-predicative moment, such a hermeneutical awareness might evolve into a vague sense of the entity’s being-this-or- that (‘whatness’), being-in-this-way-or-that (‘howness’), and being-available-at-all (‘thatness’). Still later, these vague notions might lose the sense of current meaningfulness and develop, at level 3, into the explicit metaphysical concepts of the essence, modality and existence of the entity.
The second level of disclosure may be expressed in the following thesis: within any given world, to be an entity is to be always already disclosed as something or other. This corresponds to the traditional doctrine of metaphysics concerning a trans-generic (transcendental) characteristic of anything that is: regardless of its kind or species, every entity is intrinsically disclosed in its being (omne ens est verum).
Heidegger argues that while it is based on and is even aware of this second level of disclosure, metaphysics has no explicit understanding of disclosure-as-such or of its source in being-in-the-world. What is more, he claims that the disclosedness of entities-in-their-being (level 2) tends to overlook and obscure the very disclosure-as- such (level 1) that originally makes it possible. He further argues that there is an intrinsic hiddenness about disclosure-as-such, which makes overlooking it virtually inevitable (see §6).
Level 3. Being-in-the-world and the resultant pre-predicative disclosedness of entities as being-thus-and-so make it possible for us to enact the predicative disclosure of entities. At this third level of disclosure we are able to represent correctly to ourselves, in synthetic judgments and declarative sentences, the way things are in the world. A correct synthetic representation of a complex state of affairs (a correct judgment) is ‘true’, that is, disclosive of things just as they present themselves. Such a predicative, apophantic sentence (‘S is P’) is able to be true only because world-disclosure has already presented an entity as significant at all and thus allowed it to be taken as thus and so. This already disclosed entity is the binding norm against which the assertion must measure itself.
At level 3, however, it is also possible to misrepresent things in thought and language, to fail to disclose them just as they present themselves in the world. At level 1 Dasein is always and only disclosive. But with predicative disclosure at level 3 (as analogously with hermeneutical disclosure at level 2) Dasein’s representing of matters in propositional statements may be either disclosive or non-disclosive, either true or false.
One of Heidegger’s reasons for elaborating the levels of disclosure is to demonstrate that science, metaphysics and reason in general, all of which operate at level 3, are grounded in a more original occurrence of disclosure of which they are structurally unaware. This is what he intends by his claim ‘Science does not think’. He does not mean scientists are stupid or their work uninformed, nor is he disparaging reason and its accomplishments. He means that science, by its very nature, is not focused on being-in-the-world, even though being-in-the-world is ultimately responsible for the meaningful presence of the entities against which science measures its propositions.
Heidegger calls human being ‘Dasein’, the entity whose being consists in disclosing and understanding being, whether the being of itself or that of other entities. In so far as Dasein’s being is a disclosure of its own being, it is called ‘existence’ or ‘ek- sistence’: self-referential standing-out-unto-itself. Dasein’s very being consists in being related, with understanding and concern, to itself.
But Dasein is not just related to itself. Existence occurs only as being-in-the-world; that is, the openness of human being to itself entails the openness of the world for other entities. One of Heidegger’s neologisms for ‘openness’ is ‘the there’ (das Da), which he uses in two interrelated senses. First, human being is its own ‘there’: as a thrown project, existence sustains its own openness to itself. And second, in so doing, human being also makes possible the world’s openness as the ‘there’ for other entities. Human being’s self-disclosure makes possible the disclosure of other entities.
Heidegger calls human being in both these capacities ‘being-the-there’ – Dasein, or sometimes Da-sein when it refers to the second capacity. In ordinary German Dasein means existence in the usual sense: being there in space and time as contrasted with not being at all. However, in Heidegger’s usage Dasein means being disclosive of something (whether that be oneself or another entity) in its being. In a word, Dasein is disclosive. And since human being is radically finite, disclosure is radically finite.
The Greek word for disclosure is alēthēia, a term composed of the privative prefix a- (un- or dis-) and the root lēthē (hiddenness or closure). Heidegger finds the finitude of dis-closure inscribed in the word a-lēthēia. To disclose something is to momentarily rescue it from (a-) some prior unavailability (lēthē), and to hold it for a while in presence.
Heidegger discusses three levels of disclosure, ranging from the original to the derivative, each of which involves Dasein: (1) disclosure-as-such, (2) the disclosedness of entities in their being, and (3) disclosure in propositional statements. Heidegger’s chief interest is in the first. There, disclosure/alēthēia is the original occurrence that issues in meaningful presence (being).
Heidegger argues that levels 1 and 2 are distinct but inseparable and, taken together, make possible level 3. The word ‘truth’ properly applies only at the third level, where it is a property of statements that correctly represent complex states of affairs. Therefore, to the question ‘What is the essence of truth?’ – that is, ‘What makes the truth of propositions possible at level 3?’ – Heidegger answers: Proximally, the disclosure of entities in their being (level 2); and ultimately, disclosure-as-such (level 1). His argument unfolds as follows.
Level 1. Disclosure-as-such is the very opening-up of the field of significance. It is the engendering and sustaining of world on the basis of Dasein’s becoming-absent. In so far as it marks the birth of significance and the genesis of being, disclosure-as-such or world-disclosure is the reason why any specific entity can have meaningful presence at all.
There are three corollaries. First, the disclosure of world never happens except in Dasein’s being; indeed, without Dasein, there is no openness at all. The engendering and sustaining of the dynamic relations that constitute the very possibility of significance occurs only as long as Dasein exists as mortal becoming. And conversely, wherever there is Dasein, there is world. Second, disclosure-as-such never happens apart from the disclosedness of entities as being this or that. In speaking of disclosure ‘as such’, Heidegger is naming the originating source and general structure of all possible significance that might accrue to any entity at all. The result of disclosure-as- such is the fact that referral-to-mortal-Dasein (that is, significance) is the basic state of whatever entities happen to show up. Third, disclosure-as-such is always prior to and makes possible concrete human action in any specific world. Such concrete actions run the risk of not being disclosive (that is, being mistaken about the meaning of something). By contrast, world-disclosure is always disclosive in so far as it is the opening-up of the very possibility of significance at all.
Alēthēia/disclosure-as-such – how it comes about, the structure it has, and what it makes possible – is the central topic or ‘thing itself’ of Heidegger’s thought. He sometimes calls it the ‘clearing’ of being. He also calls it ‘being itself’ or ‘being-as- such’ (that is, the very engendering of being). Frequently, and inadequately, he calls it the ‘truth’ of being.
Level 2. What disclosure-as-such makes possible is the pre-predicative availability of entities in their current mode of being. This pre-predicative availability constitutes level 2, the basic, everyday disclosedness of entities as meaningfully present. This disclosedness is always finite, and that entails two things.
First, what disclosure-as-such makes possible is not simply the being of an entity but rather the being of that entity as or as not something: for instance, this stone as not a missile but as a hammer. I know the stone only in terms of one or another of its possibilities: the entity becomes present not fully and immediately but only partially and discursively. Thus the entity’s being is always finite, always a matter of synthesis-and- differentiation: being-as-and-as-not. Second, disclosure-as-such lets an entity be present not in its eternal essence but only in its current meaning in a given situation; moreover, it shows that this specific entity is not the only one that might have this meaning. For example, in the present situation I understand this stone not as a paperweight or a weapon but as a hammer. I also understand it as not the best instrument for the job: a mallet would do better.
Even though it is a matter of synthesis-and-differentiation, this pre-predicative hermeneutical understanding of being requires no thematic articulation, either mental or verbal, and no theoretical knowledge. It usually evidences itself in the mere doing of something. Nevertheless, in a more developed but still pre-predicative moment, such a hermeneutical awareness might evolve into a vague sense of the entity’s being-this-or- that (‘whatness’), being-in-this-way-or-that (‘howness’), and being-available-at-all (‘thatness’). Still later, these vague notions might lose the sense of current meaningfulness and develop, at level 3, into the explicit metaphysical concepts of the essence, modality and existence of the entity.
The second level of disclosure may be expressed in the following thesis: within any given world, to be an entity is to be always already disclosed as something or other. This corresponds to the traditional doctrine of metaphysics concerning a trans-generic (transcendental) characteristic of anything that is: regardless of its kind or species, every entity is intrinsically disclosed in its being (omne ens est verum).
Heidegger argues that while it is based on and is even aware of this second level of disclosure, metaphysics has no explicit understanding of disclosure-as-such or of its source in being-in-the-world. What is more, he claims that the disclosedness of entities-in-their-being (level 2) tends to overlook and obscure the very disclosure-as- such (level 1) that originally makes it possible. He further argues that there is an intrinsic hiddenness about disclosure-as-such, which makes overlooking it virtually inevitable (see §6).
Level 3. Being-in-the-world and the resultant pre-predicative disclosedness of entities as being-thus-and-so make it possible for us to enact the predicative disclosure of entities. At this third level of disclosure we are able to represent correctly to ourselves, in synthetic judgments and declarative sentences, the way things are in the world. A correct synthetic representation of a complex state of affairs (a correct judgment) is ‘true’, that is, disclosive of things just as they present themselves. Such a predicative, apophantic sentence (‘S is P’) is able to be true only because world-disclosure has already presented an entity as significant at all and thus allowed it to be taken as thus and so. This already disclosed entity is the binding norm against which the assertion must measure itself.
At level 3, however, it is also possible to misrepresent things in thought and language, to fail to disclose them just as they present themselves in the world. At level 1 Dasein is always and only disclosive. But with predicative disclosure at level 3 (as analogously with hermeneutical disclosure at level 2) Dasein’s representing of matters in propositional statements may be either disclosive or non-disclosive, either true or false.
One of Heidegger’s reasons for elaborating the levels of disclosure is to demonstrate that science, metaphysics and reason in general, all of which operate at level 3, are grounded in a more original occurrence of disclosure of which they are structurally unaware. This is what he intends by his claim ‘Science does not think’. He does not mean scientists are stupid or their work uninformed, nor is he disparaging reason and its accomplishments. He means that science, by its very nature, is not focused on being-in-the-world, even though being-in-the-world is ultimately responsible for the meaningful presence of the entities against which science measures its propositions.
posted by WRS at 4:35 AM
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